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Abstract 
This study extends prior research on the willingness of firms to significantly decrease their 
corporate taxes. It specifically examines the associations between corporate tax avoidance and 
the reported significant uncertainty of a firm’s tax position, the tax expertise and tax affiliations 
of its directors, and the performance-based remuneration incentives of its key management 
personnel. Based on a dataset of 200 publicly listed Australian firms over the 2006-2010 period 
(1,000 firm years), we find that the reported uncertainty of a firm’s tax position, the tax expertise 
of its directors, and the performance-based remuneration incentives of its key management 
personnel are significantly positively associated with tax avoidance. Conversely, firms with 
board members who have at least one tax-related affiliation are significantly negatively 
associated with tax avoidance.  
 
Keywords: corporate tax avoidance, tax uncertainty, directors’ tax expertise, directors’ tax 
affiliation, performance-based management remuneration incentives. 
 
JEL Classifications: H25; H26; K34. 
 
1. Introduction 
Corporate taxes can adversely affect a firm’s financial position, financial performance, 
liquidity, operational results and cash flows (Grubert and Mutti, 1991; Shackelford and Shevlin, 
2001; Dhaliwal et al., 2005; Beattie et al., 2006). This study extends prior research on the 
willingness of firms to aggressively decrease their corporate taxes. It specifically investigates the 
associations between corporate tax avoidance 1  and the reported significant uncertainty of a 
firm’s tax position, the tax expertise and tax affiliation of its directors, and the performance-
based remuneration incentives of its key management personnel. We examine the association 
between the reporting of uncertain tax positions and tax avoidance given that the Australian 
Taxation Office (ATO) requires firms to report uncertainties regarding tax positions, tax payable 
                                                 
1 Corporate tax avoidance is defined in this study as any transaction or event (“passive” or “aggressive”) that leads 
to a reduction in the amount of corporate taxes paid by a firm (see, e.g., Dyreng et al., 2008). Tax avoidance may be 
achieved through legitimate methods in accordance with tax legislation provisions. In fact, tax reduction methods 
may be either passive (complying with tax provisions) or aggressive (structuring transactions or activities with one 
of the principle objectives to decrease the amount of corporate taxes). Tax avoidance may alternatively be achieved 
through illegal means or means that are not in compliance with tax legislation provisions. These particular methods 
constitute tax evasion. 
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and tax recovery. The management and disclosure of tax risks by firms has come under 
increasing scrutiny by the ATO. Prior research has either provided little in the way of relating 
specific corporate governance and remuneration attributes to corporate tax avoidance or provided 
mixed results. We thus examine the associations between tax avoidance and specific board 
attributes such as tax experience, tax affiliation, and the performance-based remuneration 
incentives of key management personnel to determine whether managerial opportunities, 
incentives and capabilities exacerbate or impede the likelihood of tax-aggressive planning. 
Australian firms have come under increased monitoring by the ATO and other tax authorities 
such as the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) for a range of corporate tax avoidance activities. In 
particular, income shifting, strategic debt placement, research and development deductions, bad 
debt deductions, interest expense deductions, and the use of tax havens have recently been major 
areas of the ATO’s focus (2010; 2012). In fact, according to the ATO: “Australia’s top 200 listed 
companies are deriving significantly more of their income from overseas sources. Multinational 
groups may attempt to structure their global operations to minimize tax costs by, for example, 
maximizing the proportion of their profits recorded in low-tax jurisdictions” (ATO, 2012, p. 43). 
Recent media releases have also emphasized the ability of multinational firms operating in 
Australia (e.g., Apple, Google and Starbucks) to exploit the differences in tax laws, rules and 
regulations across multiple jurisdictions to significantly decrease the amount of corporate taxes 
they pay internationally (Australian Financial Review, 2012). 
Using a dataset of 200 publicly listed Australian firms over 2006-2010 (1,000 firm years), we 
find that the reported uncertainty of a firm’s tax position, the tax expertise of its directors, and 
the performance-based remuneration incentives of its key management personnel are 
significantly positively associated with corporate tax avoidance. On the other hand, firms with 
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board members who have at least one tax-related affiliation are significantly negatively 
associated with tax avoidance. 
This study makes several important contributions. First, it investigates the association 
between corporate tax avoidance and a firm’s reported uncertainties of its tax position, which has 
not been explicitly examined in prior studies. Our findings suggest that the disclosure of 
uncertainty related to the calculation of a firm’s tax position is significantly positively associated 
with tax avoidance. Indeed, firms are likely to disclose tax uncertainties due to their participation 
in complex and obfuscatory tax avoidance activities. Risky or aggressive tax planning may 
obscure the firm’s actual performance and decrease the information content of its taxable 
income. Second, this study examines the associations between tax avoidance and other variables 
such as directors’ tax expertise, directors’ affiliations with tax-related bodies (e.g., with The 
Board of Taxation and/or The Institute of Taxation), and the performance-based remuneration 
incentives of key management personnel, and is one of the first to do so. Third, this study 
complements other recent studies on tax avoidance carried out in the U.S. (e.g., Armstrong, 
2012; Cheng et al., 2012; McGuire et al., 2012) by analyzing the tax-motivated activities of 
publicly listed Australian firms on which there is negligible evidence in the literature. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 considers the related theory and 
develops hypotheses. Section 3 reports the research design. Section 4 provides the empirical 
results. Finally, Section 5 concludes the paper. 
 
2. Background and hypotheses development  
Dyreng et al. (2008) observe that the behavior of key executives may have a significant effect 
on the level and nature of corporate tax avoidance as a result of how they influence the internal 
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control and risk functions of firms and their management. In fact, Frank et al. (2009) find a 
positive association between tax and financial reporting aggressiveness. They provide examples 
of firms engaging in the earnings management of taxable profits and financial profits 
simultaneously, with their book income managed upward (“aggressive financial reporting”) and 
their taxable income managed downward (“aggressive tax reporting”) during the same reporting 
period. Firms that exhibit aggressive tax and financial earnings management strategies at the 
same time tend to have concomitant aggressive investing, financing, operating and compensation 
strategies (Frank et. al., 2009).  
Revsine et al. (2002) claim that the tax footnotes in a firm’s annual report may be used to 
provide a more informed assessment of its current and future performance. They also argue that 
an increase in deferred tax liability may be an early signal of deteriorating earnings quality. 
Moreover, studies by Lev and Nissan (2004), Hanlon (2005) and Hanlon et al. (2007) find that 
larger book-tax differences (BTDs) are significantly associated with earnings persistence and 
timeliness. Thus, the disclosure of uncertainties related to the derivation of tax estimates may 
decrease the informativeness of BTDs. For example, uncertainties in the derivation of tax 
estimates due to the existence of operations in variably taxed jurisdictions could result in 
adjustment uncertainty via differential tax rates in the book-tax reconciliation statements.2 
In this paper, we argue that variables pertaining to the reported uncertainty of a firm’s tax 
position, the tax expertise and tax affiliations of its board members, and the remuneration-based 
incentives of its key management personnel are significant determinants of corporate tax 
avoidance. 
                                                 
2 Assistant Australian Treasurer David Bradbury further emphasizes that: “large multinational companies that use 
complex arrangements and contrived corporate structures to avoid paying their fair share of tax should not be able to 
hide behind a veil of secrecy” (The Treasury, 2012, p. 2). To that end, the ATO now requires large firms to report on 
their tax positions from 2012 if required, specifically as they relate to the likelihood of tax liabilities and any tax 
uncertainties the firm may have in terms of its reportable transactions (ATO, 2012). 
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2.1. Reported uncertainty of a firm’s tax position 
Recent research has considered the reporting of uncertain tax positions supported by complex 
international arrangements as indicative of aggressive tax behavior (e.g., Mills et al., 2010; Rego 
and Wilson, 2012; Lisowsky et al., 2013). 3  Aggressive tax strategies impose significant 
uncertainty for a firm in terms of applying tax legislation and deriving tax estimates. 
Uncertainties over current tax liability (or current tax asset) estimates may be reported in a firm’s 
financial statement notes if its management faces significant uncertainty in estimating the firm’s 
tax liabilities (e.g., provision for taxes based on the global variability in taxes to be paid) or 
assets (e.g., estimates of deferred tax assets based on the criteria that tax losses will probably be 
recouped at a future point). When a firm reports significant tax uncertainty, it signals that it is 
facing certain tax risks. These risks occur due to the high likelihood of a mismatch between the 
reported tax expense (and liability) of the firm’s tax returns (and financial statements) and what 
the firm should be paying the tax authority (e.g., the ATO). They are exacerbated when the firm 
is engaged in complex arrangements with management, and when auditors encounter difficulties 
in correctly applying tax legislation. 
The increased focus on tax risks in Australia and the U.S. has been prompted by the complex 
arrangements of multinational firms, including the widespread use of operations domiciled in 
OECD (2006) listed tax havens (see Appendix A). The recent implementation of reportable tax 
positions by the ATO (or FIN 48 Accounting for Uncertainty in Income Taxes in the U.S.) 4 
                                                 
3 Consistent with Hanlon and Heitzman’s (2010) study, tax positions or determinations are viewed conceptually as 
falling along a continuum from highly certain (“least aggressive”) to highly uncertain (“most aggressive”).   
4 FIN 48 Accounting for Uncertainty in Income Taxes, effective for the fiscal years beginning after December 15, 
2006, is classified as Accounting Standards Codification (ASC) 740-10-25 under the Financial Accounting 
Standards Board’s (FASB’s) new codification for U.S. generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP).    
 7 
requires firms to analyze and disclose their income tax risks5 and uncertainty in terms of their tax 
positions and tax payable or tax recovery.6  
Given the demand for greater disclosure of tax risks and uncertainties by the ATO and IRS, 
boards of directors (and audit committees) are now examining how firms manage their tax risks. 
In particular, the ATO and IRS stress that the board must take charge in evaluating the firm’s tax 
profile, the strategies of its tax department, the process by which tax uncertainties are identified 
and documented, and the procedures in place to integrate tax analysis into business decisions. 
Further, the board must ensure that the firm’s overall risk management programs address tax 
risks. The board, which liaises with a tax manager and audit committee, is required to understand 
the firm’s uncertain tax position, significant judgments and estimates and internal controls, in 
addition to the tax issues surrounding its major transactions (KPMG, 2010). 
Alexander et al. (2008) measure corporate tax avoidance in the U.S. by examining the amount 
of unrealized tax benefits that would influence effective tax rates (ETRs) if realized, and the 
interest and penalties associated with unrealized tax benefits based on FIN 48. In Australia, an 
entity must disclose any tax-related contingent liabilities and contingent assets in accordance 
with AASB 137 Provisions, Contingent Liabilities and Contingent Assets (AASB, 2010). 
Contingent liabilities and assets may arise, for example, from unresolved tax disputes with the 
ATO. Australian firms recognize liabilities for anticipated tax audit issues based on 
management’s estimate of whether additional corporate taxes are payable sometime in the future. 
                                                 
5 According to the results of a 2011-2012 tax risk survey conducted by Ernst and Young (2012), 75% of firm 
executives experienced a rise in the volume of aggressiveness of tax audits, and 97% of the tax authorities surveyed 
indicated that tax risk related to international structures and cross-border transactions would be on the tax 
enforcement radar over the next three years. 
6 For instance, the ATO requires large firms to file a statement entitled Uncertain Tax Positions along with their 
2011 and later tax returns, signifying the pervasive nature of these uncertainties and the related concern of the tax 
authorities. 
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This occurs if the firm’s final tax outcome is different from the current and deferred tax estimates 
in the current accounting period. 
Wilson (2010) claims that firms with the propensity to use off-balance-sheet financing tend to 
have no or significantly lower reported interest expenses in their annual reports compared with 
the quantum of interest expenses reflected in their tax returns, which generates tax deductions. 
Wilson’s (2010) assertions are based on research by Mills and Newberry (2005), who find that 
firms with lower credit ratings report lower interest expenses in their annual reports compared 
with that recorded in tax returns. It is thus possible that tax avoidance is associated with the 
reporting of significant uncertainties over the derivation of tax estimates in the annual report.  
The complex nature of transactions makes it difficult for stakeholders to fully evaluate firm 
performance, including the tax implications of these transactions or arrangements (Desai and 
Dharmapala, 2007). Balakrishnan et al. (2011) find that firms that exhibit aggressive tax 
planning tend to display increased financial and organizational complexity and decreased 
information transparency. Lisowsky et al. (2013) observe a positive association between firms 
that disclose a tax reserve in their financial statements and their use of tax shelters as a principle 
mechanism to reduce the amount of taxes they pay. These studies show that tax disclosures (or 
more specifically, the disclosure of significant uncertainties in the derivation of tax estimates and 
ultimately taxable income) may be useful ex-ante in identifying firms that are aggressively 
decreasing their corporate tax liabilities. Firms that record uncertainty in their tax estimate 
derivations reduce the informativeness of accounting income to taxable income reconciliation 
statements in their financial statements, and may thus affect the decisions of their investors. 
Prior studies have suggested that financial statement disclosures of tax information provide 
estimates of a firm’s tax liability that are opaque at best (Lisowsky, 2007). Uncertainty over tax 
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accounting estimates is a potential determinant of corporate tax avoidance. Managers may 
exploit their inherent subjectivity when estimating tax amounts to facilitate tax avoidance, as 
judgments are required on the application and interpretation of income tax legislation, on 
calculating the quantum of deferred taxes, on the creation of tax reserves related to ongoing or 
potential tax audits, and on the ability of the firm to recoup carry-forward tax losses (CFTLs). 
The complexities and obscurity related to tax planning in multiple jurisdictions are likely to give 
rise to uncertainties when deriving tax estimates. To formally test the association between 
corporate tax avoidance and a firm’s reported uncertainties of its tax position, the following 
hypothesis is proposed. 
H1: The disclosure of a significant uncertainty over a firm’s tax position is positively 
associated with corporate tax avoidance, ceteris paribus. 
 
2.2. Tax expertise of directors 
The board of directors represents the apex of decision control within a firm. It is ultimately 
responsible for monitoring the firm’s management and its major strategic and operational 
decisions (Fama and Jensen, 1983). Dyreng et al. (2010) claim that directors and top 
management personnel influence risky or aggressive tax planning by establishing a tone and 
framework of compliance for a firm. Recent research (e.g., Frank et al., 2009; Dyreng et al., 
2010) has suggested that aggressive tax planning is associated with managerial opportunism and 
capabilities. Hanlon and Slemrod (2009) argue that the directors of some large multinational 
firms state in their annual reports that they owe it to shareholders to decrease taxes through any 
permissible, legitimate and legal means. Board members who have tax expertise are thus able to 
effectively use their professional ability to monitor and provide information to managers, and to 
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monitor the firm’s compliance with applicable tax laws (Carter et al., 2010). However, the 
development and implementation of arrangements to significantly decrease a firm’s corporate tax 
liability requires the coordination of a diverse group of professionals, including the tax 
department, legal advisors, accountants, auditors and financial advisors, all of whom may offer 
tax advice as an input to these arrangements. 
If board members have the requisite tax experience, they may contribute the necessary 
resources toward the development of tax arrangements and add significantly to the effective tax 
function in terms of decreasing the firm’s corporate tax liabilities (Maydew and Shackelford, 
2005). Directors who have prior tax experience may identify additional opportunities due to their 
expertise in approving and formulating tax plans. Their incentive would be to increase the after-
tax returns to shareholders, which may also include themselves (Maydew and Shackelford, 
2005). To formally test the influence of board members’ tax expertise on corporate tax 
avoidance, the following (non-directional) hypothesis is proposed. 
H2: Board members who have tax expertise are associated with corporate tax avoidance, 
ceteris paribus. 
 
2.3. Tax affiliations of directors  
Firms and their directors may suffer reputational damage from ongoing or future tax audits, 
especially when aggressive tax schemes or arrangements become public knowledge. Recent 
cases in Australia (e.g., James Hardie) and the U.S. (e.g., Apple, Google and Starbucks) have 
shown that public scrutiny and commentary in the public media may affect investor sentiment 
and ultimately firm value (Hanlon and Slemrod, 2009). 7  Hanlon and Slemrod (2009) cite 
                                                 
7 News about tax aggressive activities may affect share prices and firm valuations either positively or negatively 
(Hanlon and Slemrod, 2009). For instance, Hanlon and Slemrod (2009) find that the share prices of U.S. firms 
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examples of large U.S. multinational firms (e.g., General Electric) that disclose statements in 
their annual reports to indicate that their tax strategies should not be harmful to their reputations. 
The firms infer from these disclosures that their management is concerned about being labeled as 
“tax aggressive” or “poor corporate citizens” if they were to, for example, establish tax strategies 
that relied excessively on the use of tax havens. In fact, such a concern arises due to the flow-on 
reputational and political costs that ensue because of negative media attention.  
If the members of a firm’s board of directors are affiliated with various professional tax-
related bodies that are connected to the government, then they are more likely to ensure that the 
firm’s tax practices conform with legal requirements (i.e., the tax acts applicable to the 
jurisdictions in which the firm operates), professional body requirements, peer practices and 
community expectations and values. Non-conformity with these requirements and practices may 
negatively affect the reputations of the board members and the firm. Thus, the directors and 
firms exposed to the potential reputational damage resulting from non-conformity are more 
likely to adhere to legal and professional requirements and demands and less likely to engage in 
tax aggressive activities. In fact, according to the Australian Inspector-General of Taxation: “At 
the same time, these companies also need to assess the maintenance of social and political 
relationships for each given jurisdiction in which business is conducted. Large business 
companies are typically subject to significant levels of public and regulatory forms of scrutiny 
and are not in a position to pay out corporate funds without a legal or commercial obligation. 
Directors also have a range of important legal obligations imposed upon them personally in 
addition to the companies they represent” (Inspector-General of Taxation, 2011, p. 3). 8  To 
                                                                                                                                                             
decline on average when their involvement in tax havens is publicly disclosed. The negative backlash appears to be 
focused on firms in the retail sector and less so on firms that have high cash ETRs. 
8 The directors of Australian firms are directly responsible for ensuring that corporate taxes are paid, and that the 
firms comply with tax legislation pursuant to the Taxation Administration Act 1953 (Cth). 
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formally test the influence of board member tax affiliation on corporate tax avoidance, we 
propose the following hypothesis. 
H3: Firms with board members who have tax affiliations are negatively associated with 
corporate tax avoidance, ceteris paribus. 
 
2.4. Performance-based remuneration incentives of key management personnel 
The motivation of key management personnel (i.e., directors and executives) to engage in 
corporate tax avoidance could be influenced by remuneration incentives (Watts and Zimmerman, 
1990; Walsh and Ryan, 1997). Nevertheless, Phillips (2003) finds no evidence that CEOs whose 
bonuses are tied to after-tax earnings performance are more motivated to engage in tax 
avoidance. Desai and Dharmapala (2006) examine the association between management 
compensation and tax avoidance. They propose that increased compensation helps to align the 
incentives of agents and principals in an agency framework that induces management to 
undertake risky investment, finance and tax decisions. This association can be inverted if the 
managerial rent diversion and the use of tax havens act as substitutes for each other. Desai and 
Dharmapala (2006) find that an increase in incentive compensation decreases the use of tax 
havens by firms that have weak corporate governance structures.  
Dyreng et al. (2010) assert that directors set the “tone at the top” in terms of a firm’s 
compensation arrangements, which may have flow-on consequences that are related to tax 
compliance. Minnick and Noga (2010) find that remuneration for directors and CEOs is 
associated with lower long-run ETRs. Rego and Wilson (2012) argue that equity-based 
remuneration incentives motivate managers to undertake risky tax planning. Managers with 
proportionately larger at-risk-cash- and equity-based (share-based payment and options) 
 13 
remuneration are motivated to increase after-tax returns for shareholders and the firm, and one of 
the most effective ways to achieve this is to decrease the amount of the firm’s income tax 
expense. Performance-based remuneration incentives provide managers with sufficient 
compensation to undertake risky and aggressive tax activities that typically lead to tax avoidance. 
These risks could include the uncertainty related to a firm’s tax position, a loss of reputation 
capital and the costs associated with audits initiated by tax authorities. Rego and Wilson’s (2012) 
results provide some support for these assertions. They associate managers of firms that have 
proportionately greater equity-based remuneration with lower (accounting and cash) ETRs and 
wider BTDs (Rego and Wilson, 2012).  
Armstrong et al. (2012) investigate the association between tax director compensation and the 
measures of U.S. firm tax aggressiveness. They find a strong negative association between tax 
director compensation incentives and accounting ETRs, but no significant association with cash 
ETRs. This result suggests that the accounting tax expense may be a more informative measure 
of executive actions on taxes. In addition, Armstrong et al. (2012) find no significant association 
between compensation incentives and BTDs.9  
In examining the association between remuneration-based incentives and tax avoidance, any 
potential linkage may not necessarily be the direct result of tax planning but instead be the result 
of a concerted effort by the board of directors and executives to decrease corporate tax liabilities. 
For instance, any association may be the result of a firm’s normal commercial activities, which 
along with investing and financing activities may also include activities designed to decrease the 
amount of corporate taxes paid (Armstrong et al., 2012).  
                                                 
9 Gaertner (2013) similarly document a significant negative association between after-tax CEO incentives and 
accounting ETRs. 
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Based on the aforementioned discussion, we expect a positive association between the 
performance-based remuneration of key management personnel and corporate tax avoidance. 
This assertion is formalized in the following hypothesis. 
H4: Performance-based remuneration incentives of key management personnel are positively 
associated with corporate tax avoidance, ceteris paribus. 
 
3.  Research design 
3.1. Sample selection and data source 
Our sample for empirical testing initially consisted of the top 300 publicly listed Australian 
firms over 2006-2010.10 However, we excluded financial firms (39), insurance firms (11), U.S. 
GAAP reporting firms (16), property partnership or trust entities (11), and firms that did not 
report across all five years of the 2006-2010 period because they were newly incorporated, were 
taken over or merged with other firms (23). The final sample thus consists of 200 firms (1,000 
firm years). Finally, all of the tax and financial-accounting-related data were hand-collected from 
the annual reports. 
 
3.2. Dependent variable 
To improve the robustness of our results, we employ four measures of corporate tax 
avoidance (i.e., ETRs and BTDs) that have been implemented in prior studies as our dependent 
variable (see, e.g., Manzon and Plesko, 2002; Desai and Dharmapala, 2006; Dyreng et al., 2008, 
2010; Chen et al., 2010; Cheng et al., 2012; McGuire et al., 2012). Each measure of tax 
                                                 
10 The sample period of 2006-2010 was chosen due to the significant level of activity carried out by the ATO in 
terms of its reviews and audits of large-firm tax planning over the period (ATO, 2010). 
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avoidance is a reflection of tax planning that decreases a firm’s tax liability without necessarily 
decreasing its accounting income. 
Our first tax avoidance measure (ETR1) is calculated as the total tax expense (comprising 
both current and deferred tax expenses) scaled by pre-tax accounting income. The second 
(ETR2) is calculated as cash taxes paid scaled by pre-tax accounting income. A disadvantage of 
using accounting tax expense is that it comprises current and deferred tax expenses, and the latter 
may result from large deferred tax adjustments (Hanlon, 2005). The advantage of using cash 
taxes being paid over accounting tax expense is that tax avoidance strategies are more likely to 
be reflected in cash outlays for tax rather than accounting tax expense (Dyreng et al., 2008). 
Cash tax outlays can be reduced using strategies that involve increasing deductions and 
decreasing taxable income. However, when computing ETRs based on cash taxes paid, 
significant cash payments related to settlements with the ATO on prior-year tax returns can 
present a problem. Finally, negative measures of ETR1 and ETR2 concern the presence of 
income tax refunds or benefits. If a sample firm received an income tax refund in a given year, 
we set its ETR measures at zero in line with the study by Dyreng et al. (2008). 
We also used BTDs as a measure of corporate tax avoidance (Graham et al., 2012). Firms that 
are relatively successful at avoiding taxes are likely, although not necessarily always able, to 
sustain large differences between their accounting and taxable income (Alexander et. al., 2008; 
Dyreng et al., 2008; Frank et al., 2009; Rego and Wilson, 2012). In fact, transactions can be 
structured to generate large temporary or permanent differences in the two kinds of income.11 
Our third tax avoidance measure (BTAX1) assesses the raw BTD as per a study by Manzon and 
Plesko (2002), calculating it as the pre-tax accounting income less the taxable income and scaled 
by lagged total assets. Taxable income is computed as income tax expense divided by the 
                                                 
11 For instance, the use of R&D tax credits can lead to permanent BTDs. 
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corporate statutory tax rate of 30%. The fourth tax avoidance measure (BTAX2) is calculated as 
the BTD residual using the method developed by Desai and Dharmapala (2006).12 They argue 
that rather than reflecting increased levels of tax avoidance, the BTD may reflect earnings 
management activities in which income is adjusted to avoid reporting losses or to achieve 
performance benchmarks or remuneration-based objectives. Following Desai and Dharmapala 
(2006), we adjust the BTD to control for the earnings management activities that could be 
responsible for the difference. In particular, we remove the BTD component attributable to 
earnings management to leave a residual value that is inferred to measure corporate tax 
avoidance (Desai and Dharmapala, 2006). 
 
3.3. Independent variables 
Our independent variables are denoted by the reporting of a significant uncertainty related to a 
firm’s tax position (TRU), director tax expertise (TAXEXP), director tax affiliation (TAXAFF), 
and the performance-based remuneration incentives of the firm’s key management personnel 
(REM).  
TRU is measured as a dummy variable of 1 if the firm discloses a significant uncertainty 
related to its tax position and 0 otherwise. We collect this information from the financial 
statement notes in firms’ annual reports. TAXEXP is measured as a dummy variable of 1 if at 
least one member of the firm’s board of directors has tax expertise (i.e., prior experience in tax 
accounting or tax-related audit work) and 0 otherwise. TAXAFF is measured as a dummy 
variable of 1 if at least one member of the firm’s board of directors has a minimum of one 
                                                 
12 A description of the method developed by Desai and Dharmapala (2006) for calculating the BTD residual is 
provided in Appendix B. 
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affiliation to a tax-related professional body (i.e., The Board of Taxation13 and/or The Institute of 
Taxation) and 0 otherwise. We obtain the information related to directors’ tax expertise or 
affiliation from the directors’ report or the corporate governance section of firms’ annual reports. 
REM is measured as the total performance-based remuneration incentives paid to the firm’s key 
management personnel (i.e., the total at-risk cash bonus and total equity-based remuneration paid 
to the key management personnel) scaled by the total remuneration paid to the key management 
personnel. We collect the information related to the remuneration of key management personnel 
from the remuneration reports.   
 
3.4. Control variables 
Our study includes several control variables pertaining to firm size, leverage, capital intensity, 
R&D intensity, inventory intensity, CFTLs, tax haven use, the market-to-book value of equity, 
operating performance (i.e., return on assets), board of director independence, Big 4 auditor 
designation, CEO tenure, industry sectors effects and year effects. 
Firm size (SIZE) controls for the effect of the size of the firm on tax avoidance. Rego (2003) 
observes that larger firms can achieve economies of scale via tax planning and have resources 
and incentives to decrease group tax. SIZE is measured as the natural log of total assets. 
Leverage (LEV) is included as a control variable because it is expected that firms that have 
higher debt-to-equity ratios are more efficient at minimizing corporate taxes. Rego (2003) finds 
that higher-leveraged firms have lower ETRs, as they use debt deductions to significantly 
decrease the amount of corporate taxes they pay. LEV is measured as long-term debt scaled by 
total assets. 
                                                 
13 The Board of Taxation is an independent, non-statutory body established to advise the Australian government on 
the development and implementation of tax legislation, and the ongoing operation of the tax system. 
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Capital intensity (CINT) and inventory intensity (INVINT) are included as control variables 
for highly capital-intensive or inventory-intensive firms, respectively (Stickney and McGee, 
1982). CINT is positively associated with tax avoidance due to the accelerated depreciation 
charges based on asset lives. So far as INVINT is a substitute for CINT, inventory-intensive 
firms should be less tax avoidant than capital-intensive firms; thus, INVINT is negatively 
associated with tax avoidance (Stickney and McGee, 1982). We measure CINT as net property, 
plant and equipment scaled by total assets, and INVINT as inventory scaled by total assets.  
We also incorporate R&D intensity (RDINT) as a control variable in our study, as prior 
research has found it to be positively associated with tax avoidance owing to the tax-deductible 
nature of R&D expenditure (Gupta and Newberry, 1997; Richardson and Lanis, 2007). We 
measure RDINT as R&D expenditure scaled by total assets. 
CFTLs are also included as a control variable. Dyreng et al. (2008) find that firms with 
CFTLs have the opportunity to use them in the future to offset revenue or capital gains and 
significantly decrease the amount of corporate taxes they pay. The use of CFTLs in a given 
accounting period may thus reflect a firm’s tax-planning activities, which may in turn indicate its 
wider tax avoidance behavior (Dyreng et al., 2008). CFTL is measured as a dummy variable of 1 
when a firm has CFTLs and 0 otherwise. 
Tax haven use (THAV) (measured as a dummy variable of 1 if the firm has at least one 
subsidiary firm incorporated in an OECD (2006) listed tax haven and 0 otherwise) controls for 
the firm’s use of tax havens. Studies by Desai et al. (2006), Desai and Hines (2002), Dharmapala 
and Hines (2009), and Taylor and Richardson (2012) find tax haven use to be positively 
associated with corporate tax avoidance. 
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We also include a growth control variable represented by MKTBK (measured as the market 
value of equity scaled by the book value of equity) (Gupta and Newberry, 1997) in our study. 
However, due to the conflicting results obtained for MKTBK in prior research, we make no sign 
prediction for this variable.  
We incorporate return on assets (ROA) (measured as the pre-tax income scaled by the total 
assets) into our study to control for the firm’s operating performance (Gupta and Newberry, 
1997). No sign prediction is made for ROA due to the conflicting results in prior research.  
Board of director independence (BODI) controls for differences in the monitoring capacity of 
directors on the firm’s board. Fama and Jensen (1983) assert that independent directors have a 
greater incentive to monitor firm management, and possess knowledge and skills that may assist 
them in making firm-related decisions. Concern for reputation in the labor market also provides 
independent directors with a greater incentive to act in the best interest of shareholders when 
monitoring management vis-à-vis non-executive directors (Coles et al., 2008). BODI is measured 
as the proportion of board members who are independent directors. 
Big 4 audit firm use (AUD) is included in our study to control for firm monitoring and audit 
quality (Matsumura and Tucker, 1992; Rezaee, 2005). AUD is measured as a dummy variable of 
1 if the firm employs a Big 4 external auditor and 0 otherwise. However, due to the conflicting 
results obtained for AUD in prior research, we make no sign prediction for this variable. 
CEO tenure (CEO) is also included as a control variable, and reflects the degree of managerial 
power and experience of the firm’s CEO. In fact, CEOs with greater power are likely to receive 
more compensation (Bugeja at al., 2013) and have greater control over firm management, which 
may have flow-on effects for tax risk management and reporting. CEO is measured as the natural 
log of the CEO’s tenure (in years). No sign prediction is made for this variable.  
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The following industry-sector (INDSEC) dummy variables defined at the two-digit GICS 
code level are included as control variables, as it is possible for tax avoidance to fluctuate across 
different industry sectors (Omer et al., 1993): capital goods, consumer service retail, energy, 
food, stables and beverage, materials, media, pharmaceuticals and health care, real estate, 
transport, and utilities (the omitted sector in our regression model). No sign predictions are made 
for these variables. 
Finally, we include year dummy variables (YEAR) in our regression model to control for the 
differences in corporate tax avoidance or other activities that potentially existed over the 2006-
2010 sample years (with 2010 being the omitted year in our regression model). No sign 
predictions are made for these variables. 
 
3.5. Regression model 
Our ordinary least squares (OLS) regression model, which we use to examine the incentives 
for corporate tax planning and reporting, is estimated as follows: 
CTAit = αit + β1TRUit + β2TAXEXPit + β3TAXAFFit + β4REMit + β5SIZEit + β6LEVit  
+ β7CINTit + β8RDINTit + β9INVINTit + β10CFTLit + β11THAVit + β12MKTBKit  
+ β13ROAit + β14BODIit + β15AUDit + β16CEOit + β17-25INDSECit + β26-29YEARit  
+ εit                                                                                                                                                                                     (1)    
where i = firms 1–200; t = the financial years 2006–2010; CTA = the corporate tax avoidance 
proxy measures (ETR1, ETR2, BTAX1 and BTAX2); TRU = a dummy variable of 1 if the firm 
discloses a significant uncertainty of its tax position and 0 otherwise; TAXEXP = a dummy 
variable of 1 if at least one member of the board of directors has tax expertise (i.e., prior 
experience in tax accounting or tax-related audit work) and 0 otherwise; TAXAFF = a dummy 
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variable of 1 if at least one member of the board of directors has a minimum of one affiliation to 
a tax-related professional body (i.e., The Board of Taxation and/or The Institute of Taxation) and 
0 otherwise; REM = the total performance-based remuneration incentives paid to key 
management personnel (the total at-risk cash bonus and total equity-based remuneration paid to 
the key management personnel) scaled by the total remuneration paid to the key management 
personnel; SIZE = the natural logarithm of total assets; LEV = long-term debt scaled by total 
assets; CINT = net property, plant and equipment scaled by total assets; RDINT = R&D 
expenditure scaled by total assets; INVINT = total inventory scaled by total assets; CFTL = a 
dummy variable of 1 when a firm has CFTLs and 0 otherwise; THAV = a dummy variable of 1 if 
the firm has at least one subsidiary firm incorporated in an OECD (2006) listed tax haven and 0 
otherwise; MKTBK = the market value of equity scaled by the book value of equity; ROA = pre-
tax income scaled by total assets; BODI = the proportion of board members who are independent 
directors; AUD = a dummy variable of 1 if the firm employs a Big 4 external auditor and 0 
otherwise; CEO = the natural logarithm of the CEO’s tenure (in years); INDSEC = a dummy 
variable of 1 if the firm is represented in the specific GICS category and 0 otherwise; YEAR = a 
dummy variable of 1 if the year falls within the specific year category and 0 otherwise; and ε = 
the error term. 
 
4.  Empirical results 
4.1. Descriptive statistics 
Table 1 reports the descriptive statistics for the dependent variables (ETR1, ETR2, BTAX1 
and BTAX2), independent variables (TRU, TAXEXP, TAXAFF and REM) and control variables 
(SIZE, LEV, CINT, RDINT, INVINT, CFTL, THAV, MKTBK, ROA, BODI, AUD and CEO). 
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The dependent variables ETR1, ETR2, BTAX1 and BTAX2 have means of 0.160, 0.195, 0.029 
and –0.003, respectively. The independent variable TRU has a mean of 0.373, indicating that 
around 37.3% of the sample firms disclose a significant uncertainty related to the derivation of 
their tax estimates. 14 TAXEXP and TAXAFF have means of 0.083 and 0.086 respectively, 
indicating that 8.3% of the firms have board members who have tax expertise and that 8.6% of 
the firms have directors who are affiliated with a tax-related professional body. REM has a mean 
of 0.345, indicating that the total (at-risk) performance-based remuneration incentives 
component for the key management personnel is 34.5% of the total remuneration. The mean, 
median and range of the control variables are also presented in Table 1. 
We collect additional (untabulated) data related to tax-experienced and tax-affiliated directors 
from the director reports or corporate governance section of the annual reports to ascertain 
whether these directors could influence their boards’ tax planning and tax risk management 
activities. In terms of the tax-experienced directors, 70.83% are independent non-executive 
directors and 29.17% are non-independent directors, 8.33% of whom constitute managing 
directors. Tax-experienced directors are well represented on committees, including 25% on audit 
committees, 16.66% on risk committees, 4.1% on compliance committees, 29.16% on 
nomination committees, and 20.83% on remuneration committees. For the tax-affiliated 
directors, 95% are independent non-executive directors, 10% of whom constitute board chairs, 
and 5% are non-independent directors. Tax-affiliated directors are also well represented on board 
committees, including 55% on audit committees, 35% on risk committees, 10% on compliance 
committees, 30% on nomination committees and 20.83% on remuneration committees. Of the 23 
                                                 
14 The sample firms disclose significant uncertainty in the derivation of their tax estimates in relation to: (a) the 
quantum and timing of deferred taxes (26); (b) global tax provisions (32); (c) the use of CFTLs (32); (d) tax 
deductions (4); (e) ongoing tax audits (2) and (f) the application of income tax legislation (10). The sample firms 
also typically disclose significant uncertainties in the derivation of their tax estimates for more than one area. 
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firms with tax-experienced directors and 20 firms with tax-affiliated directors, five firms have 
both tax-experienced and tax-affiliated directors on their boards.15 These data suggest that the 
tax-experienced and tax-affiliated directors are likely able to influence board decisions given 
their significant representation on board committees and that many of these directors are 
members of two or three committees. The tax-affiliated directors are far more independent as a 
whole and are better represented on the audit, risk and compliance committees compared with 
the tax-experienced directors. Further, the tax-affiliated directors may have a greater monitoring 
capacity in terms of ensuring that their firms’ tax risks are adequately managed and that their tax 
compliance is at a high level.16  
[Insert Table 1 About Here] 
4.2. Correlation results 
The Pearson pairwise correlation results are presented in Table 2. Significant correlations are 
found between ETR1, ETR2 and BTAX2 and the independent variables TRU, TAXEXP, 
TAXAFF and REM, and the control variables SIZE, LEV, RDINT, INVINT, CFTL, THAV, 
ROA, BODI, AUD and CEO (p < 0.10 or better). However, no significant correlations are found 
between BTAX1 and the independent variables. Table 2 also indicates that only moderate levels 
of collinearity exist between the independent variables used in this study.17 In particular, the 
highest correlation coefficient of 0.425 is found between LEV and SIZE (p < 0.01). Finally, we 
calculate variance inflation factors (VIFs) when estimating the regression model to test for signs 
of multi-collinearity between the independent variables. Our (untabulated) results confirm that 
                                                 
15 Of these five firms, two have separate tax-experienced and tax-affiliated board members. Cases where the same 
board member has both tax experience and tax affiliations are not likely to influence the results. 
16 Research by John and Senbet (1998) finds that a board’s effectiveness may be affected by not only its composition 
(e.g., size, CEO power, independence, experience and affiliations) but also its administrative structure. Boards may 
use committees to facilitate long-run tax planning decisions that are designed either to enhance after-tax wealth 
maximization for the firm and its shareholders or to monitor top-level management.   
17 Hair et al. (2006) indicate that a correlation coefficient value for a pair of explanatory variables between ±0.25 
and ±0.75 exhibits a moderate level of collinearity between the two variables. 
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none of the VIFs exceed five for any of our independent variables. As such, multi-collinearity 
does not present a problem for our study (Hair et al., 2006).18 
[Insert Table 2 About Here] 
4.3. Regression results 
Table 3 reports the results of the OLS regression model. The regression coefficient for TRU is 
negative and significantly associated with ETR2 (p < 0.10) and is positive and significantly 
associated with both BTAX1 (p < 0.10) and BTAX2 (p < 0.01). Thus, H1 is supported by the 
results. Firms that report a significant uncertainty in the derivation of tax estimates have lower 
cash ETRs, suggesting that firms engaging in complex and potentially obfuscatory tax avoidance 
activities generally pay lower taxes. In addition, firms that report significant uncertainty related 
to the calculation of their tax estimates have wider BTDs. The regression coefficient for 
TAXEXP is negative and significantly associated with ETR1 (p < 0.05) and is positive and 
significantly associated with both BTAX1 (p < 0.10) and BTAX2 (p < 0.01), so H2 is supported. 
Firms with directors who possess tax-related expertise tend to have lower accounting ETRs and 
wider BTDs. The regression coefficient for TAXAFF is positive and significantly associated 
with both ETR1 (p < 0.05) and ETR2 (p < 0.01) and is negative and significantly associated with 
BTAX2 (p < 0.01). Accordingly, H3 is supported by the results. Firms with board members who 
possess tax-related affiliations are expected to have higher ETRs. This potentially reflects a 
firm’s adherence to tax laws, owing to its reputational concerns and lower likelihood of 
aggressive tax planning. Moreover, firms with directors who are affiliated with tax-related bodies 
are likely to have smaller BTDs. The regression coefficient for REM is negative and 
significantly associated with ETR1 (p < 0.10) and ETR2 (p < 0.05) and is positive and 
                                                 
18 Hair et al. (2006) advise that a VIF value above the threshold of ten corresponds with a high level of multi-
collinearity among the explanatory variables. 
 25 
significantly associated with BTAX2 (p < 0.05). Therefore, H4 is supported. Firms with key 
management personnel who derive a proportionately greater amount of performance-based 
remuneration incentives from at-risk-cash- and share-based payments have lower ETRs and 
wider BTDs. The directors and senior executives of these firms may have the incentive to 
significantly avoid corporate taxes, because at-risk-cash- and equity-based remuneration is 
closely tied to after-tax earnings. Finally, in terms of the control variables, tax avoidance is 
shown to be significantly associated with SIZE, LEV, INVINT, CFTL, MKTBK, ROA, AUD 
and CEO in several of our regression model specifications (p < 0.10 or better).19  
[Insert Table 3 About Here] 
4.4. Propensity matching scores 
A potential limitation of our prior analysis is that the independent variables TAXEXP, 
TAXAFF and REM may suffer from a self-selection bias. In other words, a board may select 
directors with particular tax experience or affiliations or remunerate members based on the tax 
complexities faced by the firm, which may not be systematically associated with our tax 
avoidance measures. To the extent that the linearity assumption of our OLS regression analysis is 
violated, the prior analysis may be mis-specified, resulting in biased coefficient estimates.  
As a robustness check of our main regression results reported in Table 3, we implement a 
propensity matching analysis in two steps (see, e.g., Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983; Armstrong et 
al., 2012; Lennox et al., 2013). First, we run separate logit regression models for TAXEXP and 
TAXAFF, and an OLS regression analysis for REM for each year. The explanatory variables 
used in each model include TRU along with the control variables (SIZE, LEV, CINT, RDINT, 
INVINT, CFTL, THAV, MKTBK, ROA, BODI, AUD, CEO and INDSEC). TAXEXP, 
                                                 
19 As a basic robustness check of our regression results, we run separate cross-sectional OLS regressions for each of 
the years during the 2006-2010 period. The (untabulated) results are similar in scope to those reported in Table 3. 
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TAXAFF and REM are also included as independent variables contingent upon the specific 
dependent variable used. The predicted estimates from each model are used as the propensity 
scores for each firm-year observation. Second, we form “one-to-one” matched pairs for 
TAXEXP, TAXAFF and REM, respectively, based on the propensity scores. In a majority of the 
cases, the propensity scores are matched to two decimal places in the analysis. 
Consistent with the econometric procedure used by Lennox et al. (2013), we include all of the 
economic and corporate governance variables in our regression models. Although little 
theoretical work has modeled the determinants of board member TAXEXP and TAXAFF, prior 
research has provided some evidence of the variables that are likely to influence the appointment 
of such directors to a board. For example, larger firms are more likely to require the services of 
directors with some tax knowledge and tax affiliations due to complex multinational financial 
and tax planning arrangements, and the need to keep abreast of new corporate tax administration 
and tax legislation application developments. Firms with complex operating, financial and 
monitoring structures are likely to benefit from the appointment of independent directors who 
have a range of expertise and affiliations (Linck et al., 2008). In addition, Linck et al. (2008) 
claim that because oversight costs increase in line with firm complexity and operation intensity, 
boards require members who have diverse sets of skills and networks. As evidenced by R&D tax 
concessions (aligned with R&D intensity), directors who have tax experience and/or tax 
affiliations may self-select to firms that are larger, have more complex tax arrangements, have 
CFTLs, and have tax-haven-incorporated subsidiaries. 
 In terms of REM, directors may self-select to larger, more profitable and more complex firms 
(in terms of capital structure, capital intensity, R&D intensity and tax planning arrangements) 
that are likely to pay larger at-risk-cash- and/or equity-based remuneration compared with 
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smaller, less-complex firms (Hutchinson and Gul, 2006). Larger firms also tend to be 
characterized by more independent boards, use Big 4 external auditors and have longer-serving 
CEOs (Linck et al., 2008). The size and complexity of a firm are also considered important in 
determining the level of performance-based remuneration. Larger, more complex firms attract 
more experienced and qualified board members, and pay for such quality and expertise 
(Hutchinson and Gul, 2006). REM may also be associated with the strength of a firm’s corporate 
governance structure and CEO influence (Matolcsy et al., 2012; Bugeja et al., 2013). 
We establish three sets of matched pairs of firm years. Although their observable 
characteristics are similar, their TAXEXP, TAXAFF and REM variables are dissimilar. We are 
able to effectively match 168, 172 and 512 firm-year observations for TAXEXP, TAXAFF and 
REM,20 respectively. After matching on these variables, any difference in the outcome of interest 
(i.e., ETR1, ETR2, BTAX1 and BTAX2) can be attributed to the differences in TAXEXP, 
TAXAFF and/or REM rather than to the differences in the other variables. We perform separate 
(untabulated) t-tests of the differences in ETR1, ETR2, BTAX1 and BTAX2 on each of the 
matched samples of TAXEXP, TAXAFF and REM, respectively. 21  We find significant 
differences in ETR1, ETR2, BTAX1 and BTAX2 overall in terms of the matched samples of 
TAXEXP, TAXAFF and REM (p < 0.10 or better). 
We report the regression results based on the matched samples in Table 4. Consistent with the 
results provided in Table 3, statistically significant regression coefficients are shown for TRU, 
TAXEXP, TAXAFF and REM and several of the tax avoidance measures (ETR1, ETR2, 
BTAX1 and BTAX2) for the subsamples based on matched director tax expertise and matched 
                                                 
20 The performance-based remunerations are divided into two groups (i.e., “high” and “low”), separated by the 
median value of REM. 
21 Because the differences in means of ETR1, ETR2, BTAX1 and BTAX2 are normally distributed, we use t-tests in 
our analysis. 
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director tax affiliation (p < 0.10 or better). However, REM shows slightly less-significant 
regression coefficients for the subsample based on the total performance-based remuneration 
incentives paid to key management personnel (p < 0.10 or better). Overall, the matching analysis 
tends to show that our regression results are attributable to systematic differences in the presence 
of directors who have tax expertise, and affiliations and the total performance-based 
remuneration incentives paid to key management personnel rather than to differences in the other 
characteristics.  
 [Insert Table 4 About Here] 
5.  Conclusion 
This study examines the association between corporate tax avoidance and a firm’s reported 
uncertainty of its tax position, the tax expertise and affiliations of its directors, and the 
performance-based remuneration incentives of its key management personnel. Our results show 
that a firm’s reported uncertainty of its tax position, the tax expertise of its directors, and the 
performance-based remuneration incentives of its key management personnel are significantly 
positively associated to tax avoidance. Further, firms with board members who have at least one 
tax-related affiliation display a significantly negative association with tax avoidance.  
Our findings are important given that corporate tax avoidance represents an outcome of 
managerial opportunism, incentives and capabilities. This appears to be the first study to 
explicitly examine the association between tax avoidance and a firm’s reported uncertainty of its 
tax position. In fact, the reporting of uncertain tax positions could assist tax authorities in 
gauging the nature of aggressive tax arrangements from publicly available information (e.g., the 
annual report), and has important implications for financial reporting. Our study also appears to 
be one of the first to empirically examine the associations between tax avoidance, the tax 
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expertise and affiliations of a firm’s directors, and the performance-based remuneration 
incentives of a firm’s key management personnel. The significant associations found between 
these variables in our empirical analysis highlight the key roles that directors and top 
management personnel play in influencing a firm’s aggressive or risky tax planning activities. 
An important upshot of our findings is that various tax authorities (e.g., the ATO and the IRS) 
have recently demanded greater disclosure of firms’ tax risks. Hence, corporate boards are now 
taking a harder look at how firms are managing tax risks. 
This study is subject to several limitations. First, our sample is drawn from publicly listed 
Australian firms, and we develop proxy measures of tax avoidance due to the private and 
confidential nature of corporate tax data. Second, this study focuses only on Australia. To 
determine the generalizability of our findings, it may be useful to conduct similar analyses in 
other jurisdictional settings such as Canada, the U.K. and the U.S.  
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OECD (2006) Listed Tax Havens 
 
The OECD’s (2006) 33 tax havens are represented as follows: Anguilla, Antigua and Barbuda, Bahamas, 
Bahrain, Bermuda, Belize, British Virgin Islands, Cayman Islands, Cook Islands, Cyprus, Dominica, Gibraltar, 
Grenada, Guernsey, Isle of Man, Jersey, Liberia, Malta, Marshall Islands, Mauritius, Montserrat, Nauru, Netherlands 
Antilles, New Caledonia, Panama, Samoa, San Marino, Seychelles, St. Lucia, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Vincent and 









































Description of Desai and Dharmapala’s (2006) Method for Computing the Book-tax Gap Residual 
 
Applying the Desai and Dharmapala (2006) methodology, taxable income is calculated as TIit = accounting 
income tax expense divided by the corporate statutory tax rate of 30%. The BTD is calculated by subtracting TI 
from pre-tax accounting income (AI): BTDit = AIit – TIit. The BTD is scaled by lagged total assets. The sample is not 
restricted to firms with positive BTD as those firms with TI > AI can and do use CFTLs to reduce the amount of 
corporate taxes paid. Total accruals (TA) were calculated for each firm in each year using a measure of total 
accruals developed by Healy (1985). TAs is considered to measure the earnings management component of BTD 
and is computed as follows:  
TAit = EBEIit – CFOit                                                                                                                               (2) 
where: 
i = firms 1–200; 
t = financial years 2006–2010; 
TA = total accruals; 
EBEI = Pre-tax income; and 
CFO = cash flows from operations.  
The following OLS regression is performed to account for the component of BTD attributable to earnings 
management: 
BTDit = β1TACit + μit + εit                                                                                                                                       (3) 
where: 
BTD = the book-tax difference scaled by lagged total assets; 
TA = total accruals scaled by lagged total assets; 
μ = the residual; and 
ε = the error term. 
The residual value of BTD is considered by Desai and Dharmapala (2006) to reflect tax avoidance activity (TA): 


























Variable Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Median Maximum 
ETR1 0.160 0.189 0.000 0.095 0.706 
ETR2 0.195 0.229 0.000 0.147 0.752 
BTAX1 0.029 0.247 –0.649 0.001 0.316 
BTAX2 –0.003 0.665 –3.233 0.125 1.417 
TRU 0.373 0.484 0.000 0.000 1.000 
TAXEXP 0.083 0.276 0.000 0.000 1.000 
TAXAFF 0.086 0.281 0.000 0.000 1.000 
REM 0.345 0.238 0.000 0.316 0.950 
SIZE 20.399 1.916 13.823 20.437 25.586 
LEV 0.442 0.253 0.000 0.471 2.719 
CINT 0.345 0.767 0.000 0.227 0.759 
RDINT 0.007 0.037 0.000 0.000 0.537 
INVINT 0.015 0.053 0.000 0.000 0.584 
CFTL 0.705 0.456 0.000 1.000 1.000 
THAV 0.145 0.353 0.000 0.000 1.000 
MKTBK 5.106 41.543 –4.901 2.345 86.475 
ROA 0.079 0.151 –0.002 0.061 0.358 
BODI 0.651 0.176 0.000 0.667 1.000 
AUD 0.852 0.356 0.000 1.000 1.000 
CEO 1.457 0.991 0.000 1.609 3.526 
Variable definitions: ETR1 = income tax expense scaled by pre-tax accounting income; ETR2 = cash tax paid 
scaled by pre-tax accounting income; BTAX1 = pre-tax accounting income less taxable income (where taxable 
income is computed as income tax expense divided by the statutory corporate tax rate of 30%) using the method 
developed by Manzon and Plesko (2002) scaled by lagged (preceding year) total assets; BTAX2 = book-tax 
difference residual calculated using the method developed by Desai and Dharmapala (2006); TRU = a dummy 
variable of 1 if the firm discloses a significant uncertainty of its tax position and 0 otherwise; TAXEXP =  a dummy 
variable of 1 if at least one member of the board of directors has tax expertise (i.e., prior experience in tax 
accounting or tax-related audit work) and 0 otherwise; TAXAFF = a dummy variable of 1 if at least one member of 
the board of directors has a minimum of one affiliation to a tax-related professional body (i.e., The Board of 
Taxation and/or The Institute of Taxation) and 0 otherwise; REM = the total performance based remuneration paid 
to key management personnel (the total at-risk cash bonus and total equity-based remuneration paid to the key 
management personnel) scaled by the total remuneration paid to key management personnel; SIZE = the natural 
logarithm of total assets; LEV = long-term debt scaled by total assets; CINT = net property, plant and equipment 
scaled by total assets; RDINT = R&D expenditure scaled by total assets; INVINT = total inventory scaled by total 
assets; CFTL = a dummy variable of 1 when a firm has a carry-forward tax loss and 0 otherwise; THAV = a 
dummy variable of 1 if the firm has at least one subsidiary firm incorporated in an OECD (2006) listed tax haven 
and 0 otherwise; MKTBK = the market value of equity scaled by the book value of equity; ROA = the pre-tax 
income scaled by total assets; BODI = the proportion of board members who are independent directors; AUD = a 
dummy variable of 1 if the firm employs a Big-4 external auditor and 0 otherwise; and CEO = the natural logarithm 
of the CEO’s tenure. 















Pearson Correlation Results 
 ETR1 ETR2 BTAX1 BTAX2 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10 11 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 
1. TRU –0.015 –0.014 0.024 0.063** –                
2. TAXEXP –0.086*** –0.077** 0.034 0.077** 0.008 –               
3. TAXAFF 0.087*** 0.101*** –0.005 –0.189*** 0.036 0.014 –              
4. REM –0.029 –0.068** 0.022 0.029 0.018 0.041 –0.18 –             
5. SIZE –0.159*** –0.302*** 0.024 0.042 0.127*** 0.010 –0.010 0.348*** –            
6. LEV –0.179*** –0.243*** 0.020 0.257*** 0.044 0.031 0.047 0.097*** 0.425*** –           
7. CINT –0.014 –0.067** 0.016 0.043 0.034 –0.036 0.116*** –0.030 0.097*** –0.007 –          
8. RDINT –0.062** –0.049 0.009 0.008 0.096*** –0.052* –0.047 0.028 –0.014 –0.132*** –0.051 –         
9. INVINT 0.023 0.025 –0.006 –0.123*** –0.043 0.012 –0.015 –0.037 0.081*** 0.043 0.103*** –0.044 –        
10. CFTL –0.113*** –0.148*** 0.075** 0.079*** 0.040 0.068** –0.029 0.053* –0.055* –0.111*** –0.063** 0.101*** –0.157*** –       
11. THAV –0.055* –0.081*** 0.026 0.006 0.188*** 0.030 0.106*** 0.186*** 0.367*** 0.135*** 0.081** –0.061* 0.121*** 0.117*** –      
12. MKTBK 0.024 0.031 0.001 0.022 0.050 –0.009 –0.008 –0.019 0.145*** 0.008 0.046 0.025 0.001 0.022 –0.018 –     
13. ROA 0.007 0.028 0.316*** 0.333*** –0.021 –0.020 –0.011 0.020 0.024 0.001 –0.012 –0.017 0.004 –0.087*** –0.001 0.012 –    
14. BODI 0.119*** 0.155*** –0.035 –0.096*** 0.025 –0.098*** 0.056* 0.157*** 0.286*** 0.136*** –0.014 0.100*** –0.013 –0.022 –0.157*** –0.017 –0.028 –   
15. AUD 0.157*** 0.187*** –0.005 –0.046 0.071** –0.038 0.048 0.138*** 0.323*** 0.171*** 0.066** 0.080** 0.042 –0.041 –0.108*** 0.004 0.052* 0.301*** –  
16. CEO –0.104*** –0.103*** 0.025 0.014 –0.060* –0.016 –0.025 –0.002 –0.049 0.058* –0.061* 0.040 –0.014 0.039 0.021 –0.016 –0.008 0.050 0.049 – 
Variable definitions: ETR1 = income tax expense scaled by pre-tax accounting income; ETR2 = cash tax paid scaled by pre-tax accounting income; BTAX1 = pre-tax accounting income less 
taxable income (where taxable income is computed as income tax expense divided by the statutory corporate tax rate of 30%) using the method developed by Manzon and Plesko (2002) 
scaled by lagged (preceding year) total assets; BTAX2 = book-tax difference residual calculated using the method developed by Desai and Dharmapala (2006); TRU = a dummy variable of 1 
if the firm discloses a significant uncertainty of its tax position and 0 otherwise; TAXEXP =  a dummy variable of 1 if at least one member of the board of directors has tax expertise (i.e., 
prior experience in tax accounting or tax-related audit work) and 0 otherwise; TAXAFF = a dummy variable of 1 if at least one member of the board of directors has a minimum of one 
affiliation to a tax-related professional body (i.e., The Board of Taxation and/or The Institute of Taxation) and 0 otherwise; REM = the total performance based remuneration paid to key 
management personnel (the total at-risk cash bonus and total equity-based remuneration paid to the key management personnel) scaled by the total remuneration paid to key management 
personnel; SIZE = the natural logarithm of total assets; LEV = long-term debt scaled by total assets; CINT = net property, plant and equipment scaled by total assets; RDINT = R&D 
expenditure scaled by total assets; INVINT = total inventory scaled by total assets; CFTL = a dummy variable of 1 when a firm has a carry-forward tax loss and 0 otherwise; THAV = a 
dummy variable of 1 if the firm has at least one subsidiary firm incorporated in an OECD (2006) listed tax haven and 0 otherwise; MKTBK = the market value of equity scaled by the book 
value of equity; ROA = the pre-tax income scaled by total assets; BODI = the proportion of board members who are independent directors; AUD = a dummy variable of 1 if the firm employs 
a Big-4 external auditor and 0 otherwise; and CEO = the natural logarithm of the CEO’s tenure. 
N = 1,000 for all variables. 












Variable Predicted Sign ETR1a ETR2a Predicted Sign BTAX1a BTAX2a 























































































































INDSEC ? Yes Yes ? Yes Yes 
YEAR ? Yes Yes ? Yes Yes 
       
Adj. R2 (%)  13.44% 23.64%  26.07% 52.55% 
N  1,000 1,000  1,000 1,000 
Variable definitions: ETR1 = income tax expense scaled by pre-tax accounting income; ETR2 = cash tax paid scaled by pre-tax 
accounting income; BTAX1 = pre-tax accounting income less taxable income (where taxable income is computed as income tax 
expense divided by the statutory corporate tax rate of 30%) using the method developed by Manzon and Plesko (2002) scaled by 
lagged (preceding year) total assets; BTAX2 = book-tax difference residual calculated using the method developed by Desai and 
Dharmapala (2006); TRU = a dummy variable of 1 if the firm discloses a significant uncertainty of its tax position and 0 otherwise; 
TAXEXP =  a dummy variable of 1 if at least one member of the board of directors has tax expertise (i.e., prior experience in tax 
accounting or tax-related audit work) and 0 otherwise; TAXAFF = a dummy variable of 1 if at least one member of the board of 
directors has a minimum of one affiliation to a tax-related professional body (i.e., The Board of Taxation and/or The Institute of 
Taxation) and 0 otherwise; REM = the total performance based remuneration paid to key management personnel (the total at-risk 
cash bonus and total equity-based remuneration paid to the key management personnel) scaled by the total remuneration paid to key 
management personnel; SIZE = the natural logarithm of total assets; LEV = long-term debt scaled by total assets; CINT = net 
property, plant and equipment scaled by total assets; RDINT = R&D expenditure scaled by total assets; INVINT = total inventory 
scaled by total assets; CFTL = a dummy variable of 1 when a firm has a carry-forward tax loss and 0 otherwise; THAV = a dummy 
variable of 1 if the firm has at least one subsidiary firm incorporated in an OECD (2006) listed tax haven and 0 otherwise; MKTBK = 
the market value of equity scaled by the book value of equity; ROA = the pre-tax income scaled by total assets; BODI = the 
proportion of board members who are independent directors; AUD = a dummy variable of 1 if the firm employs a Big-4 external 
auditor and 0 otherwise; and CEO = the natural logarithm of the CEO’s tenure; INDSEC = an industry sector dummy variable of 1 if 
the firm is represented in the specific GICS category and 0 otherwise; and YEAR = a year dummy variable of 1 if the year falls 
 38 
within the specific year category and 0 otherwise. 
*, **, and *** indicate significance at the .10, .05, and .01 levels, respectively. The p–values are based on two-tailed tests of 
significance. 




Regression Results – Using Matched Samples 
 Matched Sample Based on TAXEXP Matched Sample Based on TAXAFF Matched Sample Based on REM 
Variable ETR1a ETR2a BTAX1a BTAX2a ETR1a ETR2a BTAX1a BTAX2a ETR1a ETR2a BTAX1a BTAX2a 







































































































































































































































































































































































































INDSEC Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 40 
YEAR Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
             
Adj. R2 (%) 19.95% 25.55% 19.62% 42.44% 12.56% 16.82% 18.10% 41.47% 19.20% 22.85% 19.60% 32.94% 
N 168 168 168 168 172 172 172 172 512 512 512 512 
Propensity matching analysis was conducted in two steps. First, we implement separate logit regression models for TAXEXP and TAXAFF, and OLS regression models for REM for each 
year. The explanatory variables used in each model are TRU and the control variables. TAXEXP, TAXAFF and REM are also variably included as independent variables contingent on the 
dependent variable used. The predicted estimates from each model are used as the propensity scores for each firm-year observation. Second, we form one–to–one matched pairs for each of 
TAXEXP, TAXAFF and REM based on the propensity scores. We were able to effectively match a total 168, 172 and 512 firm-year observations for each of TAXEXP, TAXAFF and 
REM, respectively.  
Variable definitions: ETR1 = income tax expense scaled by pre-tax accounting income; ETR2 = cash tax paid scaled by pre-tax accounting income; BTAX1 = pre-tax accounting income 
less taxable income (where taxable income is computed as income tax expense divided by the statutory corporate tax rate of 30%) using the method developed by Manzon and Plesko 
(2002) scaled by lagged (preceding year) total assets; BTAX2 = book-tax difference residual calculated using the method developed by Desai and Dharmapala (2006); TRU = a dummy 
variable of 1 if the firm discloses a significant uncertainty of its tax position and 0 otherwise; TAXEXP =  a dummy variable of 1 if at least one member of the board of directors has tax 
expertise (i.e., prior experience in tax accounting or tax-related audit work) and 0 otherwise; TAXAFF = a dummy variable of 1 if at least one member of the board of directors has a 
minimum of one affiliation to a tax-related professional body (i.e., The Board of Taxation and/or The Institute of Taxation) and 0 otherwise; REM = the total performance based 
remuneration paid to key management personnel (the total at-risk cash bonus and total equity-based remuneration paid to the key management personnel) scaled by the total remuneration 
paid to key management personnel; SIZE = the natural logarithm of total assets; LEV = long-term debt scaled by total assets; CINT = net property, plant and equipment scaled by total 
assets; RDINT = R&D expenditure scaled by total assets; INVINT = total inventory scaled by total assets; CFTL = a dummy variable of 1 when a firm has a carry-forward tax loss and 0 
otherwise; THAV = a dummy variable of 1 if the firm has at least one subsidiary firm incorporated in an OECD (2006) listed tax haven and 0 otherwise; MKTBK = the market value of 
equity scaled by the book value of equity; ROA = the pre-tax income scaled by total assets; BODI = the proportion of board members who are independent directors; AUD = a dummy 
variable of 1 if the firm employs a Big-4 external auditor and 0 otherwise; and CEO = the natural logarithm of the CEO’s tenure; INDSEC = an industry sector dummy variable of 1 if the 
firm is represented in the specific GICS category and 0 otherwise; and YEAR = a year dummy variable of 1 if the year falls within the specific year category and 0 otherwise. 
*, **, and *** indicate significance at the .10, .05, and .01 levels, respectively. The p–values are based on two-tailed tests of significance. 
aCoefficient estimates with the t-statistics in parentheses. Standard errors are corrected using the White (1980) procedure. 
 
 
